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The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene
∗

Stephen I. Vladeck

I doubt any of my colleagues will vote to grant a [habeas] petition
if he or she believes that it is somewhat likely that the petitioner is
1
an al Qaeda adherent or an active supporter.
These cases present hard questions and hard choices, ones best
faced directly. Judicial review, however, is just that: re-view, an indirect and necessarily backward looking process. And looking
2
backward may not be enough in this new war.
“They were careless people,” he read. “They smashed things
3
up . . . and let other people clean up the mess they had made.”

In retrospect, one of the most important decisions by the United States Supreme Court in the terrorism detention litigation of the
past decade may well have been an all-but unnoticed “GVR” order
(granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding) issued by the Justices
4
5
two days after they decided Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Rasul v. Bush, and

∗

Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. Thanks to
Bobby Chesney, Amanda Frost, Jon Hafetz, Marty Lederman, and Ben Wittes for incredibly useful discussions and comments; to Kristin Makar and the editors of the
Seton Hall Law Review for the invitation to participate in this Symposium and for their
patience; and to Jason Thelen for research assistance. For full disclosure, I note that
I served at some point as co-counsel to either the detainee or to amici curiae in support of the detainee in a number of the cases discussed herein, including Al-Bihani,
Boumediene, Hamdan, Kiyemba II, and (Farhi) Mohammed.
1
Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring).
2
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
3
Editorial, A Right Without a Remedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A26 (quoting
Hon. A. Raymond Randolph, Joseph Story Distinguished Lecture: The Guantanamo Mess,
Address Delivered to the Heritage Found. (Oct. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Events/2010/10/Guantanamo-Mess (comparing the Justices in the Boumediene majority to characters in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby).
4
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
5
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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7

Rumsfeld v. Padilla in June 2004. In Bush v. Gherebi, the Court vacated a 2003 Ninth Circuit decision that had concluded, contrary to
8
the D.C. Circuit, that the federal courts did have statutory jurisdiction
over habeas petitions brought by non-citizens detained at Guantána9
mo. Indeed, Judge Reinhardt’s opinion in Gherebi had anticipated
10
many of the arguments adopted by the Court in Rasul. Nevertheless, the Justices sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit, with instruc11
tions to reconsider its decision—not in light of Rasul, but in light of
Padilla, in which the Justices had held that the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York was not the appropriate forum to
consider a habeas petition brought by a U.S. citizen detained at a
12
South Carolina navy brig.
By remanding for reconsideration in light of Padilla rather than
Rasul, the Gherebi GVR order implicitly hinted that, even though the
federal courts in general had jurisdiction over the Guantánamo habeas cases, the Supreme Court believed that there was only one appropriate venue for such suits—the federal courts in and for the District of Columbia. The Ninth Circuit got the hint, transferring Gherebi
13
to the D.C. District Court. As a result, and ever since the summer of
2004, the D.C. District Court and D.C. Circuit have exercised a de facto form of exclusive jurisdiction over any and all claims arising out of
14
Guantánamo.
6

542 U.S. 426 (2004).
542 U.S. 952 (2004) (mem.).
8
See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding
that the habeas statute did not confer jurisdiction over the Guantánamo detainees
and relying heavily on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
9
Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 952 (2004).
10
Compare, e.g., id. at 1284–99, with Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475–80, and Rasul, 542 U.S.
at 485–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
11
Gherebi, 542 U.S. at 952.
12
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442–47.
13
Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004). Based on Gherebi, the federal
district court in Seattle also transferred the initial petition for habeas or mandamus
relief filed by Salim Hamdan in which he sought to challenge his trial by military
commission. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 295, 322 n.155 (2010).
14
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795–96 (2008) (suggesting that venue is only appropriate in the D.C. courts). Of course, it does not follow from Padilla
that all Guantánamo cases must be brought in the District of Columbia, since, unlike
in Padilla, the detainees are not held within the territorial jurisdiction of any particular court. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 453 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(distinguishing Rasul). Instead, the Gherebi GVR order simply reflects the longstanding—but never analytically explained—norm that the District of Columbia is the
7
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There things stood in June 2008, when the Supreme Court in
Boumediene v. Bush held that the Guantánamo detainees are constitu15
tionally entitled to pursue habeas relief in the federal courts. In the
ensuing three years, the focus has been on how the D.C. courts would
implement Boumediene’s mandate that these cases go forward in the
absence of any statutory authority, especially given the Supreme
Court’s express delegation to the lower courts of the power to fashion
procedural, evidentiary, and even substantive rules to govern the de16
tainees’ claims. The result has been, by any account, a remarkably
17
interesting and complex body of case law. Increasingly in recent
months, these cases have also come to inform a heated debate over
the relationship between the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Boumediene.
In particular, a number of scholars, civil liberties groups, and detainee lawyers (not to mention the editorial pages of various major
newspapers) have accused the D.C. Circuit in general—and some of
its judges in particular—of actively subverting Boumediene by adopting
holdings and reaching results that have both the intent and the effect
18
of vitiating the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision.
These critiques
usually play up both the deep-seated disagreements between the D.C.
Circuit and the D.C. District Court in some of these cases (as manifested, for example, by the D.C. Circuit’s refusal thus far to affirm a
single district court holding that granted habeas relief on the me19
rits—reversing or vacating six such decisions), and the fact that progovernment rulings by the court of appeals have been reversed by the
Supreme Court in each of the Guantánamo cases that the Court has
proper venue for any individual held in U.S. custody outside the territorial United
States. See, e.g., Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1328–29 (1973) (Douglas, J.); see also
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 359 n.52 (2d ed. 1973).
15
553 U.S. at 798.
16
See, e.g., id. (“[O]ur opinion does not address the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention. That is a matter yet to be determined.”).
17
See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF
DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2d ed. 2011); Baher
Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 445 (2010).
18
See, e.g., A Right Without a Remedy, supra note 3; see also David G. Savage, Little
Headway Made at Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at A14.
19
See Latif v. Obama, No. 10-5319 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2011) (mem.); Almerfedi v.
Obama, No. 10-5291, 2011 WL 2277607 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2011); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 700 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(per curiam); Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Adahi v. Obama,
613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
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taken—decisions that, in turn, have been criticized publicly by at least
20
some of the D.C. Circuit’s judges.
As such, these critics have all but suggested that the D.C. Circuit
has an inappropriate agenda, one in which the Supreme Court’s
holdings in these cases should be given as narrow a compass as is re21
motely defensible. In contrast, defenders of the work of the court of
appeals have stressed both the extent to which Boumediene necessarily
left these issues open to judicial resolution and the near-unanimity of
the D.C. Circuit in virtually all of the post-Boumediene cases—
22
especially in its decisions on the “merits.” Indeed, even if some of
the D.C. Circuit’s judges have been outspoken in their criticisms of
the Supreme Court, the fact remains that very few of the court’s post23
Boumediene opinions have elicited published dissents, and none have
successfully been taken en banc. And with one equivocal exception,
the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in every post-Boumediene
24
Guantánamo case it has thus far been asked to hear.
In the following Symposium Essay, I aim to look more carefully
at the parameters of this debate, and the charge that the D.C. Circuit
has spent the better part of the past three years subverting Boumediene. In particular, I contrast the analyses and holdings of the court
of appeals in some of its key decisions with the Supreme Court’s instructions—such as they were—in Boumediene v. Bush, Hamdi, and, to
25
a lesser degree, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. As I hope to show (and as may

20

For a more comprehensive summary of the Supreme Court’s post-9/11 efforts,
see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122
(2011).
21
See, e.g., A Right Without a Remedy, supra note 3.
22
See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, We Have Seen the Enemy, LAWFARE (Mar. 2, 2011, 5:17
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/03/we-have-seen-the-enemy.
23
Even disagreements among panel members have usually provoked only concurrences—disputes over the rationale or the scope of the holding but not the underlying judgment. See, e.g., Almerfedi, 2011 WL 2277607, at *6–8 (Rogers, J., concurring in the judgment); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 883–86 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(Williams, J., concurring in the judgment). Judge Tatel has apparently authored a
forty-five-page dissent in the Latif case, but the opinion has not yet been declassified.
See Latif v. Obama, No. 10-5319 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2011) (mem.). Such an opinion
would be the first such dissent authored in a post-Boumediene “merits” case, as opposed to cases raising other questions.
24
The exception is Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009),
in which the Court granted certiorari and issued a short per curiam opinion remanding the case to the D.C. Circuit for consideration of changed factual circumstances.
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam).
25
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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seem unsurprising), the answer to this charge lies somewhere in the
middle.
Although there are no holdings in Guantánamo cases to which
one can point as “proof” that the D.C. Circuit has refused to take the
Supreme Court seriously, the court’s analysis as to evidentiary issues
and the burden of proof, in particular, reveals some judges who read
the Supreme Court’s work in this field for as little as it is worth—if
not less. So too, Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s assessment of whether a
26
provision of the REAL ID Act of 2005 might violate the Suspension
Clause by depriving individuals facing transfer to another country of
27
a chance to contest the legality of that transfer. Although Omar did
not arise out of Guantánamo, it may represent the most frontal assault on the logic of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion for the Boumediene Court. And in public speeches and concurrences, senior D.C.
Circuit Judges A. Raymond Randolph and Laurence Silberman have
gone even further, belittling the Supreme Court for what Judge Randolph referred to as the “mess” they made and what Judge Silberman
described as a “charade,” prompted by the Court’s “defiant—if only
28
theoretical—assertion of judicial supremacy” in Boumediene.
At the same time, some of the court’s holdings in its more outwardly controversial decisions, especially those involving the transfer
or release of the Uighurs, can be criticized, if at all, as failures of imagination or misreadings of Supreme Court precedent (for example,
as controlling the resolution of issues that may still be open). So too,
one could quibble with the D.C. Circuit’s refusal in Al Maqaleh v.
Gates to extend the protections of the Suspension Clause to non29
citizens detained in Afghanistan. But whatever one’s view of the
merits of these outcomes, it seems unfair to claim that, in these contexts, the D.C. Circuit is subverting Supreme Court rules that simply
do not exist.
Ultimately, my thesis is that, while it smacks of hyperbole to refer
to the D.C. Circuit as being engaged in a collective effort to subvert
Boumediene, it is equally unconvincing to assert that the entire court of
appeals has faithfully administered the Supreme Court’s commands

26
27
28

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2006).
Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 19–21 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concur-

ring).
29

605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

VLADECK FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1456

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/7/2011 1:40 PM

[Vol. 41:1451

30

in these cases. Instead, as I hope to show in the pages that follow,
the most troubling aspects of the court’s post-Boumediene jurisprudence can all be traced to some combination of four jurists, in particular: the aforementioned Judges Kavanaugh, Randolph and Silberman, along with Judge Janice Rogers Brown. Whether the rest of
the D.C. Circuit is reaching the correct results in other cases is beyond
the ambit of this Essay; for present purposes, my central conclusion is
that, in their opinions and their rhetoric, these four jurists are effectively fighting a rear-guard action while their colleagues coalesce
around substantive and procedural rules that are materially consistent with what little guidance the Supreme Court has provided in
these cases—and, as importantly, that have the general endorsement
of virtually all of the district judges and the executive branch. That is
by no means to commend these decisions, but rather to suggest that,
if nothing else, fealty to precedent is not one of their shortcomings.
I.

SCOPE OF DETENTION AUTHORITY

One of the most significant substantive questions at issue in the
post-Boumediene habeas cases is the scope of the government’s detention authority. It is also the issue on which the Supreme Court has
arguably provided the least amount of illumination, whether in Boumediene or any other terrorism-related case. The touchstone, all
31
(now) agree, is the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF), which provides that
30
To take one obvious—but less significant—example, the Supreme Court in
Boumediene expressly left intact the review process under the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148,119 Stat. 2680 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10, 28 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)), even though it had held it to be an inadequate substitute for habeas. The Court thereby suggested that appeals to the D.C.
Circuit of decisions by Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) might provide
the first avenue of review for most detainees, followed by habeas. See Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008) (“[B]oth the DTA and the CSRT process remain intact. . . . Except in cases of undue delay, federal courts should refrain from entertaining an enemy combatant’s habeas corpus petition at least until after the Department,
acting via the CSRT, has had a chance to review his status.”). Nevertheless, in Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the D.C. Circuit held that Boumediene
necessarily abnegated the DTA process on its face, because, in the court of appeals’
view, Congress would not have wanted the two processes to exist in parallel. Id. at
1072–74.
31
At various points, the Bush administration argued that it had power to detain
under both the Authorization for Use Military Force (AUMF) and the President’s
inherent constitutional authority as commander-in-chief. The Obama administration has refused to defend that position and has instead rested its detention arguments entirely on the AUMF. See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 n.4
(D.D.C. 2009). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Au-
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the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of ininternational terrorism against the United States by such nations,
32
organizations or persons.

Whereas the AUMF does not speak specifically to detention authority, the Supreme Court in Hamdi recognized that “[b]ecause detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary
and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably autho33
rized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here,” (i.e.,
of “individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants who
34
‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’”). Tellingly, though, Justice O’Connor sounded a note of caution against reading the AUMF too broadly. As she wrote:
[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of “necessary and appropriate force” to include the authority to detain
for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is
based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that
35
understanding may unravel.

Other than these statements, nothing in Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, or
Boumediene speaks with any further clarity as to the sweep of the
36
AUMF vis-à-vis detention.

thorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (arguing that the
AUMF provides authority for most of the counterterrorism initiatives that the Bush
administration had pegged to the President’s Article II powers).
32
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
33
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion).
34
Id. at 521.
35
Id.
36
The various opinions produced by the en banc Fourth Circuit in the al-Marri
case devote substantial attention to the proper scope of the AUMF. al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone,
129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). In that case, though, the issue went to the scope of the
AUMF as applied to a non-citizen lawfully present within the United States at the
time of his initial arrest. Although it would follow a fortiori that the authority recognized in al-Marri would apply at Guantánamo, it does not necessarily follow that the
constraints on the AUMF identified there would apply to non-citizens initially arrested
and detained outside the territorial United States.
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In Gherebi v. Obama, the D.C. District Court conducted an exhaustive analysis of Hamdi, the AUMF, and the laws of war, and concluded that
the President has the authority to detain persons who were part
of, or substantially supported, the Taliban or al-Qaeda forces that
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners, provided that the terms “substantially supported” and
“part of” are interpreted to encompass only individuals who were
members of the enemy organization’s armed forces, as that term
37
is intended under the laws of war, at the time of their capture.

Thus, the relevant question was whether the detainee was “part of or
substantially supported” the Taliban or al Qaeda, so long as either of
those criteria necessarily established that the detainee was in fact a
member of either organization’s armed forces when arrested. Without that latter qualification, Gherebi suggested that detention would
be inconsistent with the laws of war, at least insofar as principles governing international armed conflict (IAC) might apply to the non38
international armed conflict (NIAC) with al Qaeda. Because Hamdi
and Hamdan had both instructed that the AUMF should be read in
concert with the laws of war (indeed, in Hamdi, that had been the basis for the plurality’s conclusion that the AUMF authorized deten39
tion), Gherebi thereby effectively limited the scope of the AUMF to
detention generally in conformity with law-of-war principles governing IAC.
Although some D.C. district judges reached divergent conclusions concerning the precise scope of the government’s detention

37

609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 71 (D.D.C. 2009).
To be sure, it is hardly settled that IAC detention principles necessarily apply
in the context of NIAC. Indeed, a number of prominent international humanitarian
law scholars argue that NIAC provides no detention authority whatsoever—that, in
the case of NIAC, detention authority must come, if at all, from domestic law. See,
e.g., Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of U.S. Practice Relating to “Enemy Combatants,” 10 Y.B.
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 232, 278 (2009); see also Azmy, supra note 17, at 501 n.290
(collecting sources). But see Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2009) (arguing that detention that is legal during IAC
should also be legal during NIAC). I do not mean to delve into this important and
intricate debate here other than to note that, for better or worse, both the D.C. District Court and the Obama administration have generally proceeded on this assumption—that, where an individual can be detained under IAC rules, it should follow
that he can be detained in a NIAC regime, as well.
39
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2006); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519–
21(plurality opinion).
38
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40

power, Judge Walton’s analysis in Gherebi provided a useful frame41
work within which to situate the analysis, at least in the short term.
That changed with the D.C. Circuit’s first merits decision in a post42
Boumediene Guantánamo habeas case, Al-Bihani v. Obama.
For this discussion, two of Al-Bihani’s holdings are key. First,
writing for herself and Judge Kavanaugh, Judge Brown expressly rejected the notion that the laws of war had any bearing on the scope of
43
the government’s detention authority. Offering the generally uncontroversial suggestion that “Congress had the power to authorize
the President in the AUMF and other later statutes to exceed [the
44
bounds of international law],” Judge Brown did not address whether
Congress in the AUMF had in fact expressly departed from international law. Instead, she simply asserted that,
while the international laws of war are helpful to courts when
identifying the general set of war powers to which the AUMF
speaks, their lack of controlling legal force and firm definition
render their use both inapposite and inadvisable when courts
45
seek to determine the limits of the President’s war powers.

In other words, Judge Brown appeared to suggest that because
the laws of war are not precise when it comes to delineating the scope
of detention authority, Congress must not have intended to incorporate law-of-war principles, despite both (1) the canon of statutory interpretation pursuant to which statutes are presumed to be consistent
with international law; and (2) the specific language of Hamdi read46
ing the AUMF in exactly that manner.
Second, without international law to inform the scope of the
AUMF, Judge Brown turned to domestic law—and to other statutes
that might bear on the scope of the government’s detention power.
In particular, the Al-Bihani panel seized on the Military Commissions

40
See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73–77 (D.D.C. 2009). See generally Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held?: Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens,
52 B.C. L. REV. 769 (2011).
41
See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 40, at 831–36.
42
590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
43
Id. at 868–81.
44
Id. at 871.
45
Id. In her concurring opinion, Judge Brown elaborated upon her critique of
the utility of international law. Id. at 882 (Brown, J., concurring).
46
See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
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47

Act of 2006 (MCA), and its definition of who may be tried before a
48
military commission. As Judge Brown explained,
Congress, in the 2006 MCA, provided guidance on the class of
persons subject to detention under the AUMF by defining “unlawful enemy combatants” who can be tried by military commission.
The 2006 MCA authorized the trial of an individual who “engaged
in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is
not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of
the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces).” . . . The provisions
of the 2006 and 2009 MCAs are illuminating in this case because
the government’s detention authority logically covers a category
of persons no narrower than is covered by its military commission
authority. . . . [I]t is enough to recognize that any person subject
to a military commission trial is also subject to detention, and that
category of persons includes those who are part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully
and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coali49
tion partners.

The above-quoted passage is telling in three equally important—
yet distinct—respects. First, it hardly follows that those who can lawfully be tried by a military commission are a proper subset of those
who can be detained without trial. After all, under the laws of war,
those held without charges and military commission defendants are
two very different categories of detainees whose status presents two
distinct sets of questions.
Second, even if the panel’s conclusion could follow in the abstract, the MCA’s legislative history is quite clear that Congress in no
way intended to impact the substantive scope of the AUMF in defining who could be tried by a military commission. For example, the
House Armed Services Committee Report that accompanied the 2006
MCA expressly noted that the divergence between the AUMF and
MCA definitions reflected the committee’s disagreement that “the
United States must be engaged in armed conflict to try an alien unlawful enemy combatant engaged in hostilities against the United
50
States,” even though Hamdi appeared to require an armed conflict

47

Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
48
See 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (2006).
49
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 (citations omitted).
50
H.R. REP. No. 109-664, pt. 1, at 6 (2006).

VLADECK FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/7/2011 1:40 PM

D.C. CIRCUIT AFTER BOUMEDIENE

1461

51

to justify detention without trial. So construed, the difference between the MCA and the AUMF reflected Congress’s choice to incorporate the different standards and rules applicable to military trials as
contrasted with noncriminal detention under the laws of war. Thus,
it is not only a logical fallacy to read the MCA as expanding the scope
of the AUMF’s detention authority; it also runs directly counter to the
52
intent of those who wrote the latter statute.
Even if that point was only implicit with respect to the 2006
MCA, Congress made the point explicit in the wholesale 2009
53
amendments to the MCA. Thus, the Conference Report accompanying the 2009 MCA provides that the definition of who may be tried
by a military commission
is included for the purpose of establishing persons subject to trial
by military commission in accordance with section 948c, of title
10, United States Code, and is not intended to address the scope
of the authority of the United States to detain individuals in ac54
cordance with the laws of war or for any other purpose.

Given this language, it is incredibly difficult to understand how Judge
Brown could conclude that the MCA informed (and perhaps even
55
expanded) the scope of the AUMF’s detention authority. One possible justification might be that Judge Walton’s definition in Gherebi
incorporated the idea of detainees “substantially supporting” al Qaeda or the Taliban. Thus, the argument goes, there is not much daylight between a definition that relies upon “substantial” support and
one that instead requires the detainee to have been “purposefully
and materially supporting” those groups. But the point in Gherebi was
to recognize substantial support as a basis for detention to the extent
51

See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
See Steve Vladeck, Judge Randolph Pulls Another Fast One—But Will Anyone Notice?,
(Feb.
19,
2011,
4:03
PM),
PRAWFSBLAWG
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/02/
judge-randolph-pulls-another-fast-one-but-will-anyone-notice.html.
53
Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (codified in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C.).
54
H.R. REP. No. 111-288, at 862–63 (2009) (emphasis added).
55
In the district court’s decision in the Boumediene case, Judge Leon held that the
AUMF authorized detention of an “individual who was part of or supporting Taliban
or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners.” Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133,
135 (D.D.C. 2008) (emphasis added). But there is a world of difference between
“supporting . . . hostilities,” which both the Boumediene and Gherebi definitions encompassed, and “providing material support,” a statutory term of art that sweeps far
more broadly than acts of belligerency during an international or non-international
armed conflict.
52
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it was consistent with what the laws of war authorized in the context of
56
IAC.
In light of Judge Brown’s rejection of the laws of war as a constraint on the AUMF, “purposeful and material support” would presumably have the sweeping meaning that material support has under
57
U.S. domestic criminal law. The necessary implication would be
that anyone who could be prosecuted for violating the federal ma58
terial support statute for services provided to al Qaeda or the Taliban could also be detained indefinitely at Guantánamo, regardless of
whether he or she might be subject to detention under the laws of
war. As Judge Williams pointed out in his narrower opinion concurring in the judgment, not even the executive branch defended such a
59
limitless proposition.
Third, and just as importantly, although the MCA’s standard applied to non-citizens who engaged in hostilities or provided material
support, the Al-Bihani panel included in the former category the
proposition that being “part of” al Qaeda or the Taliban was sufficient to render an individual subject to detention, regardless of whether that individual had actually engaged in any acts of belligerency
60
against the United States.
In so holding, Al-Bihani rejected the
“command-structure” test that had been adopted by a number of dis61
trict judges in giving content to the term “part of,” under which the
question was “whether [the detainee] receives and executes orders or
62
directions” from—and not just whether he was “part of”—al Qaeda
63
or the Taliban. To be sure, in many (if not most) cases, these two
standards will dovetail. But when they do not (i.e., when a detainee
56

See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718–31 (2010)
(upholding against constitutional challenge 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which makes it a
crime to provide various forms of “material support,” including “training,” “personnel,” “services,” and “expert advice or assistance” to designated foreign terrorist organizations).
58
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006); see also 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2006 & Supp.
III 2010) (defining “providing material support to terrorism” as a crime triable before a military commission).
59
See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 883–86 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Williams, J.,
concurring in the judgment), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
60
See id. at 872 (majority opinion).
61
E.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009).
62
Id.
63
See e.g., Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting Al-Bihani’s
implicit repudiation of the “command structure” test), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814
(2011).
57
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does not receive and execute orders or directions from al Qaeda or
the Taliban), it is difficult to see how the detainee could properly be
a belligerent under the laws of war.
In light of these holdings, a concerted effort was made to ask the
entire D.C. Circuit to rehear Al-Bihani en banc. Formally, the court
64
of appeals disagreed. But in a curious statement co-authored by the
court’s seven active judges other than Judges Brown and Kavanaugh
(the two active judges on the Al-Bihani panel), the judges explained
that
we decline to en banc this case to determine the role of international law-of-war principles in interpreting the AUMF because, as
the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel’s discussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition of the
65
merits.

In other words, even while declining to rehear the case en banc, the
rest of the D.C. Circuit effectively converted Al-Bihani’s controversial
international law holding into dicta, a result that drew relatively sharp
66
objections from Judge Brown (largely on process grounds) and
67
Judge Kavanaugh (on substance). Perhaps as a result, in April 2011,
68
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The (non-)en banc maneuvering in Al-Bihani therefore left open
the question of whether international law should bear on the scope
of the AUMF, a point to which the court of appeals has not yet re69
turned. One might also have assumed that the panel’s MCA-based
64

Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (mem.)
Id. at 1 (Sentelle, C.J., and Ginsburg, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland, &
Griffith, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
66
Id. at 1–9 (Brown, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
67
Id. at 9–56 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). In
addition to providing the strongest defense of the panel’s conclusion that the AUMF
should not be interpreted in a manner consistent with the laws of war, Judge Kavanaugh’s concurrence also offered the unorthodox (and, to my knowledge, unprecedented) argument that “war-authorizing statute[s]” in general are uniquely poor
candidates for the “Charming Betsy canon” and should never be interpreted
“to . . . conform with non-self-executing treaties and customary international law.”
Id. at 38. Whatever else may be said about this theory (which may well merit a paper
unto itself), it suffices for present purposes to note the inconsistency between such
analysis and the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
68
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (mem.).
69
In one curious unreported decision, Judges Ginsburg, Garland, and Williams
remanded a case to the district court based on the detainee’s claim that, as a medic,
his detention was barred by Article 24 of the First Geneva Convention. Al-Warafi v.
Obama, 409 F. App’x 360, 360–61 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also Al-Warafi v.
Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2010). Presumably, the remand order necessari65
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analysis of the scope of detention power was also vitiated by the
(non-)en banc order, since the panel might not have looked to domestic law if international law provided useful criteria. Nevertheless,
a different three-judge panel (Judges Henderson, Williams, and Randolph) reaffirmed the MCA-grounded reading of the AUMF in Feb70
ruary 2011 in their remand order in Hatim v. Gates. As that panel
wrote:
[T]he district court ruled that the military could detain only individuals who were “part of” al-Qaida or the Taliban . . . . That ruling is directly contrary to Al-Bihani v. Obama, which held that
“those who purposefully and materially support” al-Qaida or the
71
Taliban could also be detained.

In other words, to whatever extent the rest of the D.C. Circuit had
mooted the international law discussion in Al-Bihani, Hatim suggests
that it remains enough in a habeas case for the government to show
that a detainee, though not “part of” al Qaeda or the Taliban, “pur72
posefully and materially supported” them.
To be sure, there has not yet been a single case in which detention authority ultimately rested solely on support, rather than membership. But given both (1) the open questions surrounding “ma73
terial support” as a basis for the exercise of military jurisdiction and
(2) the extent to which the scope of the AUMF has relevance far
74
afield of Guantánamo detention cases, this distinction matters—and
quite a bit, at that.
And as for Boumediene, it is certainly true that nothing in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court spoke at all to the appropriate scope
of the government’s detention authority. Nor did anything in that

ly accepts that Article 24 might bar the petitioner’s detention if he can make the relevant factual showings—or, at least, that the AUMF would not authorize detention inconsistent with Article 24. See First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 24, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
70
632 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
71
Id. at 721 (emphasis added).
72
Id. See also Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1073–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(quoting the Al-Bihani standard with approval). But see Al-Alwi v. Obama, No. 095125, 2011 WL 2937134, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011) (citing with approval the government’s proffered standard, pursuant to which it may only detain an individual
who was “part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners” (emphasis omitted)).
73
See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 13.
74
See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 40.
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case (or any other) undermine Judge Brown’s reading of the MCA;
the flaw in her analysis on that point derives wholly from her misread75
ing of congressional intent. But to the extent that the Supreme
Court in Hamdi and Hamdan commanded that the AUMF be interpreted in a manner that conforms with the international law govern76
ing traditional IAC, the argument that the reasoning in Al-Bihani is
subverting the Supreme Court is on somewhat firmer footing. After
all, if principles of IAC should inform the scope of the government’s
detention authority in the NIAC with al Qaeda, any reading of the
government’s detention authority that would allow detention based
purely on support (or on membership without being part of the
“command structure”), and without any showing of belligerency or
direct participation in hostilities, may well contravene those prin77
ciples. Inasmuch as the seven-judge statement in Al-Bihani all but
eliminated the holding that was directly irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in that regard, then, the “purposeful
and material support” standard adopted in Al-Bihani and reaffirmed
in Hatim could quite easily authorize detention that is inconsistent
with what the laws of war have traditionally contemplated—and, as
such, what the Court’s precedents (Hamdi, in particular) appear to
allow.
75

See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)(plurality opinion)(describing
the President’s detention authority under the AUMF as “based on longstanding lawof-war principles”); id. at 548 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he military and its Commander in Chief are authorized to deal with enemy belligerents according to . . . the laws of war.”); see also
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2006) (noting that the AUMF, among
other statutes governing military commissions, must be interpreted by reference to
the laws of war). It bears emphasizing that, in Hamdi, the conclusion that the laws of
war informed the scope of the AUMF were crucial to the plurality’s holding that the
AUMF authorized Hamdi’s detention; without such a reading, the AUMF might not
have satisfied the Non-Detention Act. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 547–48 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment); 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a) (2006). Thus, it is particularly ironic to conclude that Hamdi does not require reading the AUMF in light of international law principles, given that, without
those principles, Hamdi’s detention may well have been barred.
77
As my friend and colleague Bobby Chesney has pointed out, another possible
detention model that could incorporate material support as a basis for detention is
the security internment model provided by the Fourth Geneva Convention. Chesney, supra note 40. If that regime could apply in the context of a non-international
armed conflict, then there very well might be authority to detain individuals based
purely on non-belligerent acts of support to parties to the NIAC. The flip side, of
course, is that such a detention regime would be necessarily limited by necessity and
would require periodic review—and, in any event, is not what the U.S. government
has ever pursued under the AUMF.
76
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II. EVIDENTIARY BURDENS AND PRESUMPTIONS
As noted above, although the current D.C. Circuit case law governing the scope of the government’s detention power is troubling,
the “material support” analysis has not yet had a meaningful impact
78
on any individual cases. In marked contrast is the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence concerning the government’s burden of proof in postBoumediene habeas cases, and how that burden should affect district
court assessments of the facts of individual detainees’ claims. And
once again, the fountainhead decision was Al-Bihani. There, the
court (as it did with respect to the government’s detention authority)
reached two conclusions relevant here. First, the panel agreed with
the government that “preponderance of the evidence” is the appro79
priate burden of proof. Second, the panel also agreed that hearsay
80
evidence should generally be admissible in these cases.
Before turning to Al-Bihani’s analysis, it is worth pausing for a
moment to reflect on how the issue was framed in light of Boumediene.
As Judge Brown wrote for the Al-Bihani panel:
Habeas review for Guantanamo detainees need not match the
procedures developed by Congress and the courts specifically for
habeas challenges to criminal convictions. Boumediene’s holding
explicitly stated that habeas procedures for detainees “need not
resemble a criminal trial.” It instead invited “innovation” of habeas procedure by lower courts, granting leeway for “[c]ertain accommodations [to] be made to reduce the burden habeas corpus
proceedings will place on the military.” Boumediene’s holding
therefore places Al-Bihani’s procedural argument on shaky
ground. The Suspension Clause protects only the fundamental
character of habeas proceedings, and any argument equating that
fundamental character with all the accoutrements of habeas for
81
domestic criminal defendants is highly suspect.

In the passage from which Judge Brown was quoting, though,
Boumediene was referring to the procedural protections that attach to
criminal trials themselves, and not to “habeas challenges to criminal
82
convictions.” Nor is this a semantic distinction; it is hardly a controversial proposition that contemporary criminal defendants are en-

78

See supra text accompanying notes 72–73.
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 877–78 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1814 (2011).
80
Id. at 879.
81
Id. at 876 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
82
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008).
79
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titled to far greater procedural protections in their trial and direct
appeal than in any collateral challenges they mount thereto. Nevertheless, Al-Bihani conflated the procedural protections afforded in civilian criminal trials with those available in criminal (post-conviction)
habeas, suggesting that, because Boumediene held that Guantánamo
habeas petitions need not have the protections attendant to criminal
trials, they also need not have the (far lesser) protections attendant to
83
post-conviction habeas petitions.
If anything, a closer read of Boumediene suggests that the opposite should be true—that the Guantánamo detainees should receive
more process than those who seek to use habeas collaterally to attack
state-court convictions since their detention does not result from convictions obtained in a court of record, in which “considerable defe84
rence is owed to the court that ordered confinement.” Indeed, this
idea is more than just a passing thought within the Court’s opinion in
Boumediene. As Justice Kennedy underscored in explaining why the
review provided by the Detainee Treatment Act was inadequate,
Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say,
after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral
review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in the usual course
occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in
the outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its
own independence. These dynamics are not inherent in executive detention orders or executive review procedures. In this con85
text the need for habeas corpus is more urgent.

From the start, then, Al-Bihani approached the issue of procedural
protections from a flawed perspective, badly misreading Boumediene to
suggest that Guantánamo detainees should receive less process, not
more, than those seeking to attack convictions collaterally in civilian
courts . Given Justice Kennedy’s repeated allusions in Boumediene to
the distinct considerations governing judicial review of executive de86
tention and collateral review of state and federal convictions, it is

83
See Steve Vladeck, Judge Brown’s Sleight-of-Hand in Al-Bihani—and Why It Matters,
(May
14,
2010,
10:07
AM),
PRAWFSBLAWG
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/05/judge-browns-sleightofhandin-albihaniand-why-it-matters.html.
84
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 782.
85
Id. at 783. In this respect, Boumediene has much in common with Justice Frankfurter’s important discussion of the different goals of collateral review in Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 845–52 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing).
86
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783–87.
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difficult to understand how this point could so easily have been
missed.
Nonetheless, and in light of these observations, the Al-Bihani
panel went on to conclude that “preponderance of the evidence” is
the appropriate burden of proof in Guantánamo habeas cases, emphasizing that it was not deciding that the Constitution required such a
87
standard, but only that it seemed consistent with Hamdi—and was
88
not unconstitutional—to so hold. In addition, the panel concluded
that “the question a habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible—it is always admissible—but what
probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhi89
bits.”
As to both the burden of proof and the admissibility vel non of
hearsay, much of Al-Bihani’s reasoning seems at least superficially
compatible with Hamdi and Boumediene, on both of which the court of
90
appeals (at least here) heavily relied.
Indeed, other than Judge
Brown’s hint that the Constitution might not require a “preponderance” standard, it would not be until later cases that the D.C. Circuit
would adopt views of these holdings that strained their jurisprudential foundations and further manifested the error in Judge Brown’s
threshold framing of the procedural protections to which the detai91
nees should be entitled.
In particular, four merits decisions from the summer of 2010
92
stand out. In a trio of decisions handed down in June, three different panels affirmed district court denials of habeas relief, reaffirming
that (1) preponderance is the governing burden of proof; (2) hearsay
is admissible; and (3) in determining the sufficiency of the evidence,
the district court should not “weigh each piece of evidence in isola-

87

Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1814 (2011).
88
Id. at 878 & n.4.
89
Id. at 879; see also Khan v. Obama, No. 10-5306, 2011 WL 3890843, at *6–7
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 6, 2011) (articulating the approach to be followed in assessing the
reliability of hearsay statements).
90
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879–80.
91
Id. at 878.
92
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001
(2011); Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct.
1812 (2011); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama,
608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
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tion, but consider all of the evidence taken as a whole.” Given AlBihani’s legal conclusions, and that review of factual findings was only
for clear error, these results may have seemed particularly unremarkable at the time and can probably be seen as the D.C. Circuit generally coalescing around a series of rules that neither the district court
nor the executive branch contested. Instead, the real shift in approach came in the next decision on the merits, handed down by
94
Judge Randolph in July 2010 in Al-Adahi v. Obama. Writing for himself and Judges Henderson and Kavanaugh, Judge Randolph for the
first time reversed a district court’s grant of habeas relief in a post95
Boumediene detainee case.
At the outset, Judge Randolph devoted several pages to harsh
criticism of both the district court and the government for not taking
up the hints that the D.C. Circuit had dropped in Al-Bihani—and, to
a lesser degree, in the June trilogy—that preponderance need not be
96
the governing burden of proof. Suggesting that “we are aware of no
precedents in which eighteenth century English courts adopted a
97
preponderance standard,” Judge Randolph went on to highlight
other contexts in which detention is based on a showing less than
preponderance, including detention pending deportation, challenges to selective service decisions, challenges to convictions by
98
court-martial, and challenges to arrest prior to trial. Yet, because
the government maintained that preponderance was “appropriate”:
We are thus left with no adversary presentation on an important
question affecting many pending cases in this court and in the
district court. Although we doubt, for the reasons stated above,
that the Suspension Clause requires the use of the preponderance
standard, we will not decide the question in this case. As we did
in Al-Bihani, we will assume arguendo that the government must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that Al-Adahi was part
99
of al-Qaida.

Notwithstanding the examples marshaled by Judge Randolph
(none of which, it should be noted, remotely resemble the potentially
indefinite detention without trial at issue in the Guantánamo cases),
93
Awad, 608 F.3d at 6–7, 10; see also Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 13–15; Barhoumi, 609
F.3d at 422–24.
94
Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d 1102.
95
Id. at 1111.
96
Id. at 1104.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1105.
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the Al-Adahi panel’s frustration with the preponderance standard is,
100
in many ways, frustration not with Boumediene, but with Hamdi. After all, if Hamdi was clear about anything, it was that “some evidence,”
which the Fourth Circuit had held was a sufficient quantum of
101
proof, was a woefully inadequate basis on which to detain a U.S. citizen without charges. As Justice O’Connor wrote for the plurality,
Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly
unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls
constitutionally short. As the Government itself has recognized,
we have utilized the “some evidence” standard in the past as a
standard of review, not as a standard of proof. That is, it primarily
has been employed by courts in examining an administrative
record developed after an adversarial proceeding—one with
process at least of the sort that we today hold is constitutionally
mandated in the citizen enemy-combatant setting. This standard
therefore is ill suited to the situation in which a habeas petitioner
has received no prior proceedings before any tribunal and had no
prior opportunity to rebut the Executive’s factual assertions be102
fore a neutral decisionmaker.

There is, of course, an obvious distinction between Hamdi and
the Guantánamo cases, (i.e., the citizenship of the detainee). This
distinction might help to explain Judge Silberman’s cryptic suggestion in Almerfedi that Hamdi’s articulation of the preponderance stan103
dard was “to be sure considering due process limitations,” implying
that such a standard might not be required in the absence of such limitations. But even if Hamdi does not settle that the Constitution requires at least a preponderance standard in all cases of noncriminal
military detention, it at least offers compelling reasons why the lesser
100

Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1104–05.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003)(“Hamdi is not entitled
to challenge the facts presented in the Mobbs declaration. Where, as here, a habeas
petitioner has been designated an enemy combatant and it is undisputed that he was
captured in an zone of active combat operations abroad, further judicial inquiry is
unwarranted when the government has responded to the petition by setting forth
factual assertions which would establish a legally valid basis for the petitioner’s detention.”), rev’d, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
102
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). Although Justice O’Connor was writing for a plurality, Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in
this part of the Court’s opinion notwithstanding their disagreement over whether the
AUMF actually did authorize Hamdi’s detention. Id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
103
Almerfedi v. Obama, No. 10-5291, 2011 WL 2277607, at *4 (D.C. Cir. June 10,
2011).
101
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standard of “some evidence” would be inadequate, whether or not
the detainee is protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
104
Clause.
And yet, in its discussion of the appropriate burden of
proof, Al-Adahi nowhere discusses, cites, or even alludes to Hamdi.
Reluctantly accepting preponderance as the burden of proof, AlAdahi then turned to the sufficiency of the evidence, beginning by
chastising the district court for its “failure to appreciate conditional
105
probability analysis” —that “although some events are independent
106
In short,
(coin flips, for example), other events are dependent.”
the Al-Adahi panel castigated the district court for being far too skeptical of the government’s claims in these cases and for drawing far too
107
many inferences in favor of the detainee’s view of the facts. As with
many of the Guantánamo cases, it is difficult to adequately review the
108
court’s factual analysis, since some of the key evidence is classified.
But Al-Adahi made explicit what the June trilogy had hinted at: from
the D.C. Circuit’s perspective, the government’s evidence should be
looked at as an aggregated whole, regardless of the unreliability of
individual aspects thereof, and whether or not preponderance or
109
“some evidence” was formally the “appropriate” standard to apply.
Thus, most of the merits cases since Al-Adahi have focused on
whether the district court took Al-Adahi’s admonitions to heart. In
Salahi v. Obama, for example, Judge Tatel, writing for himself, Chief
Judge Sentelle, and Judge Brown, vacated a grant of habeas relief and
remanded for further evidence, directly invoking Al-Adahi’s criticisms
110
As Judge Tatel exof the district court’s approach to the facts.
plained:
Merely because a particular piece of evidence is insufficient,
standing alone, to prove a particular point does not mean that the
evidence “may be tossed aside and the next [piece of evidence]

104

See Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450. In that vein, consider that the Department of Defense
established CSRTs at Guantánamo on July 7, 2004, just nine days after the Supreme
Court decided Hamdi, and long before any court had suggested that non-citizens detained at Guantánamo might have the same constitutional rights as Hamdi. But see
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026–27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the Guantánamo detainees are not protected by the Due Process Clause), vacated, 130 S. Ct.
1235 (2010) (per curiam).
105
Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See id. at 1111; Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
109
Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1111.
110
625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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may be evaluated as if the first did not exist.” The evidence must
be considered in its entirety in determining whether the govern111
ment has satisfied its burden of proof.

This “mosaic” theory, as it has increasingly come to be known,
may well be a problematic application of the preponderance stan112
dard.
What cannot be gainsaid is that, with Judge Tatel’s tempered—but important—endorsement in Salahi, it appears to have the
113
backing of the entire D.C. Circuit.
One good example of this trend is the Hatim case already noted
114
But taking things one step further, Judge Kavanaugh, writabove.
ing for himself and Judges Garland and Griffith, reversed a grant of
habeas relief in Uthman v. Obama and remanded with instructions to
115
deny the petition, concluding that the evidence was clearly sufficient—even though there were strong reasons to question whether
the district court had adequately represented the countervailing evi116
dence supporting the detainee’s claim.
Perhaps the most telling reflection on Al-Adahi, though came in
117
Esmail v. Obama, decided on April 8, 2011. The per curiam opinion
for a panel comprised of Judges Tatel, Brown, and Silberman simply
applied Al-Adahi and the June trilogy to explain why the facts did not
118
counsel in favor of relief. What stands out, however, is the concurrence filed by Judge Silberman, in which he suggested that, in contrast to the occasional need in criminal cases to release defendants
111

Id. at 753 (quoting Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105).
The problem with the “mosaic” theory is simple to describe, but hard to prove.
If there are reasons why individual pieces of evidence are insufficient to satisfy a
“preponderance” standard, including a lack of reliability, those reasons do not dissipate merely because there is additional evidence that suffers from comparable reliability concerns. Thus, whereas the whole may often be greater than the sum of its
parts, it may just as easily represent the aggregation of unreliable evidence, which is
no more reliable taken as a whole than the individual items were taken individually.
And given that reliability determinations are invariably based on classified information in these cases, the public record is a poor starting point for assessment of the
D.C. Circuit’s work in this field.
113
Salahi, 625 F.3d at 746.
114
See Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
115
637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
116
See, e.g., Dafna Linzer, In Gitmo Opinion, Two Versions of Reality, PROPUBLICA
(Oct. 8, 2010, 8:34 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/in-gitmo-opinion-twoversions-of-reality (contrasting the original opinion released by the district court in
Uthman with an opinion released after the original was withdrawn and demonstrating
the marked differences in the presentation of the facts).
117
639 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
118
Id. at 1076–77.
112

VLADECK FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/7/2011 1:40 PM

D.C. CIRCUIT AFTER BOUMEDIENE

1473

the judge knows to be guilty, “candor obliges me to admit that one
cannot help but be conscious of the infinitely greater downside risk
to our country, and its people, of an order releasing a detainee who is
119
likely to return to terrorism.” As he continued:
That means that there are powerful reasons for the government
to rely on our opinion in Al-Adahi v. Obama, which persuasively
explains that in a habeas corpus proceeding the preponderance
of evidence standard that the government assumes binds it, is unnecessary—and moreover, unrealistic. I doubt any of my colleagues will vote to grant a petition if he or she believes that it is
somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent or an
active supporter. Unless, of course, the Supreme Court were to
adopt the preponderance of the evidence standard (which it is
unlikely to do—taking a case might obligate it to assume direct
responsibility for the consequences of Boumediene v. Bush). But I,
like my colleagues, certainly would release a petitioner against
120
whom the government could not muster even “some evidence.”

Judge Silberman’s statement is remarkable on several levels.
First, one might fairly read it as suggesting that he—and at least some
of his colleagues—are in fact reviewing the government’s case only
for “some evidence,” rather than the “more evidence than not” re121
quirement of the preponderance standard.
Although the review
conducted by the judges in Al-Adahi and its progeny may already have
implied as much, it seems something else altogether for a judge to
give voice to such a reality. And, as noted above, the Supreme Court
itself has provided strong reasons to doubt the sufficiency of “some
evidence” in this context, whether a higher burden is constitutionally
122
required or not.
More fundamentally, though, Judge Silberman’s concurrence
(which goes on to describe the post-Boumediene litigation as a “charade prompted by the Supreme Court’s defiant—if only theoretical—
123
assertion of judicial supremacy” in Boumediene) reveals deep-seated
124
opposition both to Boumediene itself and to the litigation it spawned.
119

Id. at 1077 (Silberman, J., concurring).
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
121
Id. at 1078.
122
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
123
Esmail, 639 F.3d at 1078 (Silberman, J., concurring).
124
For a variation on that theme, consider Judge Brown’s concurrence in AlBihani, in which she asked rhetorically “whether a court-driven process is best suited
to protecting both the rights of petitioners and the safety of our nation.” Al-Bihani v.
Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
120
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Perhaps more so than any single analytical tension between the D.C.
Circuit and the Supreme Court, such a frank concession gives the
most substance to the charge that some of the D.C. Circuit’s judges
are subverting or otherwise vitiating the effect of the Supreme
Court’s 2008 decision. After all, once the Boumediene Court held that
the Suspension Clause “has full effect” at Guantánamo, the remainder of its opinion was devoted to explaining why the CSRT process was
125
procedurally inadequate as a substitute for habeas corpus.
It may
be a bit of a stretch to compare the scope of post-Boumediene habeas
to the review that the D.C. Circuit was empowered to conduct under
the DTA, but whether or not the comparison is apt, the point remains that the D.C. Circuit’s post-Boumediene jurisprudence yields a
landscape in which petitioners have limited prospects for success on
the merits. And if Judge Silberman is correct, only in cases in which
there is virtually no evidence against the detainee, or at least no remotely credible evidence, would the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence
126
clearly provide that the petitioner is likely to prevail.
Presumably,
the government would not even defend such cases—or, at the very
least, would not appeal an adverse decision by the district court (as it
has not with regard to twenty-nine of the thirty-eight detainees for
127
whom the district court granted habeas relief).
To be clear, this is not an indictment of the D.C. Circuit writ
large. As noted above, the only judges who have openly criticized the
preponderance standard in this manner are Judges Randolph and
128
Silberman. Other than citing Al-Bihani’s reservation of whether the
Constitution requires preponderance as a minimum burden of proof,
the rest of the D.C. Circuit has—with the government’s encourage125

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
Thus, in Almerfedi v. Obama, Judge Silberman reversed a grant of habeas relief
at least in part based on his conclusion that the district court committed “clear error”
in concluding that another Guantánamo detainee’s statements were unreliable “jailhouse gossip.” No. 10-5291, 2011 WL 2277607, at *5 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2011).
127
The twenty-nine grants came in nine decisions. See Abdah (Odaini) v. Obama,
717 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2010); Al Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11
(D.D.C. 2009); Al Halmandy v. Obama, No. 05-2385 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009); Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F.
Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009); Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009);
Gharani v Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F.
Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008) (ordering release of five detainees); In re Guantanamo
Detainee Litig., 581 F.3d 33 (D.D.C. 2008) (ordering release of seventeen detainees).
The government also dropped its appeals of two habeas grants while the appeals
were pending. See Mohammed v. Obama, No. 05-5224 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2011)
(mem.); Basardh v. Gates, No. 09-5200 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 14, 2010) (mem.).
128
See supra notes 95–101, 118–21 and accompanying text.
126
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ment—applied the preponderance standard without comment, and
has effectively endorsed Judge Randolph’s “mosaic” approach articu129
lated in Al-Adahi.
As for Judges Randolph and Silberman’s position, it also bears
noting that the Justices may well be acquiescing. Thus, the Supreme
130
131
132
Court denied certiorari in Al-Adahi, Al-Bihani, Al Odah, and
133
Awad, and each time without a registered dissent or a comment
(other than to note Justice Kagan’s recusals in Al-Adahi and AlBihani). Indeed, because Justice Kagan was not recused in Al Odah
and Awad, those denials cannot be explained simply as an attempt to
avoid the four-four split on the merits that may otherwise have re134
sulted.
Instead, these cases either suggest that there are not five
Justices who disagree with the outcomes, or that the Court is suffering
from a form of what Linda Greenhouse described as “Gitmo fati135
gue.” Either way, the effect, at least with respect to the procedural
and evidentiary issues discussed above, is to give the D.C. Circuit the
last—rather skeptical—word. Certainly, the denials of certiorari
hardly pass for proof of the Supreme Court’s approval of Judges Randolph and Silberman’s approach in this field. But given that no
other court is in a position to disagree with the D.C. Circuit on these
136
issues, these denials are at least a tacit acquiescence in the status

129

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011) (mem.).
131
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (mem.).
132
Al Odah v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011) (mem.).
133
Awad v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (mem.).
134
Steve Vladeck, On Counting to Five (Without Justice Kagan) in the Guantanamo Cas(Jan.
12,
2011,
6:22
PM),
es,
PRAWFSBLAWG
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/01/on-counting-to-five-withoutjustice-kagan-in-the-guantanamo-cases.html.
135
Linda Greenhouse, Gitmo Fatigue at the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR
(Apr. 6, 2011, 8:45 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/gitmofatigue-at-the-supreme-court.
136
Curiously, in Al-Bihani, Judge Brown invoked the exclusivity of the D.C. courts’
jurisdiction as a shortcoming of the post-Boumediene process, since there would not be
“a significant number of cases brought before a large set of courts.” Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1814 (2011). Nevertheless, I think it is safe to conclude that her point was less
that there should be additional courts with the power to hear these cases than that the
whole post-Boumediene project is unwise.
130
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137

quo, until and unless, as in Al-Bihani, the rest of the D.C. Circuit is
motivated to respond.
III. REMEDIES
Perhaps the greatest public outcry concerning the D.C. Circuit’s
post-Boumediene jurisprudence, though, has come in the context of
remedies for those detainees who have been cleared (whether by the
138
executive branch or a federal court) for release. Indeed, in Boumediene itself, one of the signal defects in the CSRT process that led Justice Kennedy to conclude that it was an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus was the inability of the CSRT or the D.C. Circuit on
139
appeal to effectuate a prevailing detainee’s release. If critics of the
D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area are any guide, however, habeas might not be any more effective.
At the heart of the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence concerning remedies for those detainees cleared for release are two cases, both of
which involved Uighurs—ethnically Turkic Chinese Muslims—
140
detained at Guantánamo who could not be returned to China. In
the D.C. Circuit’s only merits decision in a CSRT appeal, Judge Garland, writing eight days after Boumediene (and joined by Chief Judge
Sentelle and Judge Griffith), held that the government no longer had
the authority to detain the Uighurs, and ordered their release “without prejudice to [their] right to seek release immediately through a
writ of habeas corpus in the district court, pursuant to the Supreme
141
Court’s decision in Boumediene.”
142
Following that suggestion, the Uighurs sought habeas relief.
The question that was thus raised in Kiyemba I was whether the detainees had a right to be released into the United States if there was no
143
other country to which they could be sent.
Although the district
144
court initially answered that question in the affirmative, the D.C.

137

See Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit in Control on Detainees, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4,
2011, 9:36 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/04/dc-circuit-in-control-ondetainees.
138
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
139
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787–88 (2008).
140
See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
141
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
142
Id. at 858.
143
555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
144
In re Guantanamo Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub
nom. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022, vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam).
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Circuit, in a harshly-worded opinion by Judge Randolph (joined by
Judge Henderson, and with a partial concurrence by Judge Rogers),
145
reversed.
Specifically, Judge Randolph’s analysis hinged on two distinct
but related conclusions. First, the federal courts in general lack the
power to order the political branches to admit non-citizens into the
146
territorial United States.
And second, to whatever extent the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment might otherwise bar the potentially indefinite detention that could result, it did not apply to
non-citizens detained at Guantánamo, and therefore provided no ba147
sis for a right to release into the United States.
I have written elsewhere in some detail about Judge Randolph’s
analysis, especially his rather crabbed understanding of the remedial
148
powers of the habeas court.
What is telling for present purposes
about Kiyemba I is not the court’s debatable reliance on the Supreme
149
Court’s 1950s-era immigration jurisprudence, but rather its due
process analysis. In particular, Judge Randolph explained that
“[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court and of this court—decisions the
district court did not acknowledge—hold that the due process clause
does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sove150
reign territory of the United States.”
What is striking about this
passage is that, even as the opinion criticized the district court for
failing to take heed of certain precedents, Judge Randolph himself
failed to pay any attention to Boumediene, which, though not about the
Due Process Clause, may well recalibrate the Court’s approach to
whether all individual constitutional rights apply extraterritorially, including whether the Guantánamo detainees are entitled to due
151
process protections. Thus, Kiyemba I reached its due process hold-

145

Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022.
Id. at 1027–29.
147
Id. at 1026–27.
148
See Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 971–
72 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE
(2010)).
149
Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1027–28 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950)).
150
Id. at 1026.
151
See e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v.
Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009).
146
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ing by effectively ignoring Boumediene, and by relying on prior deci152
sions each of which Boumediene may have called into question.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiyemba I and vacated
and remanded in light of a suggestion by the Obama administration
that the detainees had received a resettlement offer, which might the153
reby moot the controversy. On remand, the D.C. Circuit, in a per
curiam opinion that was almost certainly written by Judge Randolph,
effectively reinstated its original opinion, concluding that “[t]he
posture of the case now is not materially different than it was when
154
the case was first before us.” The second time around, the Supreme
155
Court—with Justice Kagan recused—denied certiorari. Writing for
himself and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, Justice
Breyer concurred in the denial of certiorari, explaining that “[u]nder
present circumstances, I see no Government-imposed obstacle to pe156
titioners’ timely release and appropriate resettlement.” The necessary assumption undergirding this statement is that a bona fide resettlement offer to any third-party country, or at least one in which the
detainee does not fear abuse, is the only “release” that Boumediene requires. Even if that is true, that leaves open the question of the ap157
propriate remedy in a case “where no other remedy is available.”
In contrast to the unique nature of the issue in Kiyemba I, the
158
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II) is far more
significant in its sweep, especially in light of subsequent developments. There, the question before the court was whether the federal
courts have the power to require notice and a hearing before the
159
government seeks to transfer a detainee to a third-party country. In
effect, the detainees claimed that they should have an opportunity to
contest such a transfer on the ground that they might be mistreated
or simply subjected to proxy detention on behalf of the U.S. govern-

152

See Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1027–28 (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. 206; Knauff, 338 U.S.

537).
153

Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam).
Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba III), 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).
155
Kiyemba, 131 S. Ct. at 1631(Breyer, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
156
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (per curiam).
157
Kiyemba, 131 S. Ct. at 1631 (Breyer, J., respecting the denial of certiorari)(noting that this question had been the basis for the original grant of certiorari in
Kiyemba I).
158
561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010).
159
Id. at 511.
154
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ment once they are transferred to that third-party country. Joined
by Judge Kavanaugh, Judge Ginsburg rejected that view, reading the
161
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Munaf v. Geren as standing for
the proposition that, so long as the government avers that it does not
transfer to torture, there is nothing for a federal habeas court to review on the merits, and, as such, no need for notice or a hearing
162
prior to the detainee’s removal. As he explained:
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Munaf precludes the district court
from barring the transfer of a Guantanamo detainee on the
ground that he is likely to be tortured or subject to further prosecution or detention in the recipient country. The Government
has declared its policy not to transfer a detainee to a country that
likely will torture him, and the district court may not second-guess
163
the Government’s assessment of that likelihood.
164

Judge Kavanaugh concurred separately, largely in response to
Judge Griffith’s dissent—which argued both that the Suspension
Clause unquestionably protected a detainee’s ability to object to his
transfer or removal to another country in appropriate cases, and that
the majority’s conclusion to the contrary was based on several fundamental misreadings of Munaf, which raised far more specific
165
facts. As I have suggested in some detail elsewhere, there is much
166
to commend Judge Griffith’s analysis on both points. In particular,
Unlike in Munaf, where the detainees [who were being held in
Iraq] specifically sought to block their transfer to Iraqi custody on
the merits, the petitioners in Kiyemba II sought an injunction only
requiring notice and a hearing prior to their transfer to any country, to allow them to litigate the merits. Nevertheless, the D.C.
160

Id.
553 U.S. 674 (2008).
162
Tellingly, Judge Ginsburg specifically declined to rest on Kiyemba I’s holding
that the detainees lack due process rights, even though that would have bolstered his
analysis. Instead, the Kiyemba II panel concluded that
[e]ven assuming that the Guantanamo detainees, like the U.S. citizens
in Munaf, possess constitutionally based due process rights with respect
to transfers and that the Mathews / Hamdi balancing test applies, Munaf
and other precedents preclude judicial second-guessing of the Executive’s considered judgment that a transfer is unlikely to result in torture.
Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 518 n.4.
163
Id. at 516.
164
Id. at 516–22 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
165
Id. at 522–26 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
166
Vladeck, supra note 148, at 973–76.
161
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Circuit majority concluded that “[u]nder Munaf . . . the district
court may not question the Government’s determination that a
potential recipient country is not likely to torture a detainee.”
And although Judge Ginsburg’s opinion appeared to rest on the
merits, rather than on the district court’s jurisdiction, that distinction effectively collapses in the face of the government’s blanket
assertion that it does not ever transfer or otherwise repatriate detainees to countries in which they are “more likely than not” to be
167
tortured.

In effect, then, Kiyemba II turns the Supreme Court’s extraditioncentric analysis in Munaf into a categorical bar on review of any transfer claim, including cases in which the detainee will face no criminal
charges in the receiving country. And even Munaf reserved the possibility of judicial review in a case where the detainee could prove that
the government’s assertions about conditions in the receiving country
168
were incorrect. Thus, it is not that Kiyemba II is inconsistent with, or
a subversion of, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in any of the terrorism cases. If anything, Kiyemba II is a wholly unwarranted (and
constitutionally problematic) expansion of the Court’s jurispru169
dence—Munaf, in particular.
To that end, although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
170
Kiyemba II, detainees have continued to attempt to challenge its reasoning within the D.C. Circuit. In Mohammed v. Obama, for example,
an Algerian detainee claimed that Kiyemba II should not apply in his
case because he feared mistreatment at the hands of a non-state actor, a possibility not covered by the State Department’s general aver171
ments with respect to the country conditions in Algeria.
Judges
Griffith and Kavanaugh rejected that distinction, even though Judge
172
And JusTatel, in dissent, thought it to be potentially dispositive.
167

Id. at 974 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 703 & n.6 (2008); see also id. at 706–07 (Souter,
J., concurring) (noting the limits of the Court’s holding and the eight distinct factual
conditions on which it rests).
169
For an important counterexample, consider the Third Circuit’s decision in
Khouzam v. Attorney General, which held that it violated due process to deny to a noncitizen facing removal a meaningful opportunity to contest diplomatic assurances
that he would not face torture if deported. 549 F.3d 235, 259 (3d Cir. 2008).
170
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010) (mem.).
171
Mohammed v. Obama, No. 10-5218, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16023 (D.C. Cir.
July 8, 2010) (mem.).
172
Id. at *6 (Tatel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]hile I agree
with my colleagues that Kiyemba II compels us to reverse the district court with respect to Mohammed’s allegations of torture by the Algerian government and the
court’s intention to interrogate Ambassador Fried, I would remand to allow the gov168
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tice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, dissented
from the Court’s denial of a stay in Mohammed’s case, suggesting
that she “would grant the stay to afford the Court time to consider, in
the ordinary course, important questions raised in this case and not
173
resolved in Munaf v. Geren.” Nevertheless, Mohammed was involun174
tarily repatriated to Algeria.
And in Abdah v. Obama, the petitioner sought to have his case
heard en banc as an initial matter, in an attempt to have the entire
175
D.C. Circuit reconsider Kiyemba II.
That maneuver failed, though,
as the D.C. Circuit voted six-three not to hear the case en banc, with
176
Judge Griffith, joined by Judges Rogers and Tatel, dissenting.
For
the time being, then, it seems as if Kiyemba II—and its troubling mi177
sreading of Munaf—will remain settled precedent, so much so that
citations thereto can now be found in ordinary immigration and
178
extradition cases.
The real damage wrought by Kiyemba II, though, is best understood in light of a subsequent decision by the same three judges: Omar
179
v. McHugh. Omar (in which the detainee was one of the petitioners
in Munaf) raised the constitutional question that Munaf and Kiyemba
II had both left open: whether the Suspension Clause protected a detainee’s right to claim that his transfer from the United States to foreign custody violated the U.N. Convention Against Torture, and, as
such, the federal statute implementing that treaty, the Foreign Affairs
180
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA). Although the isernment an opportunity to submit supplemental declarations as to whether, in deciding it was safe to send Mohammed to Algeria, it considered potential threats posed
by non-governmental entities.”).
173
Mohammed v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 32 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from the
denial of stay) (citation omitted).
174
Mohammed v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2091 (2011).
175
Abdah v. Obama, 630 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (mem.).
176
Id. at 1054 (Griffith, J., dissenting from the denial of initial en banc hearing)
(“The question we face today is whether Guantanamo detainees are entitled to notice of a transfer beyond the reach of the writ. If it seems odd that detainees in the
War on Terror should enjoy such a right, they do so only because Boumediene extended habeas corpus to Guantanamo. We are bound to accept the consequences of
that decision.”).
177
See, e.g., Khadr v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 2900 (2011) (denying certiorari, over two
dissents, in another case seeking to overturn Kiyemba II).
178
See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia v. Benov, 395 F. App’x 329 (9th Cir. 2010); In re
Extradition of Zhenly Ye Gon, 613 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2009).
179
646 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
180
Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–761. FARRA implements Article 3 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture, under which “[n]o State Party shall
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sue had been raised in both Munaf and Kiyemba II, neither the Supreme Court nor the Kiyemba II panel had reached it. In Omar, then,
the D.C. Circuit finally had to consider whether the REAL ID Act of
181
2005, which takes away habeas jurisdiction over FARRA claims,
might violate the Suspension Clause in light of Boumediene.
Writing for himself and Judge Ginsburg, Judge Kavanaugh answered that question in the negative. Although his argument proceeded on a number of fronts, its core reduced to one of three propositions: either (1) FARRA was never meant to apply outside the
context of immigration removal proceedings, and so there was no
182
“right” to invoke in a habeas petition; (2) FARRA did confer such a
183
right, but the REAL ID Act of 2005 repealed it; or (3) FARRA did
confer such a right, but the REAL ID Act validly withdrew federal ha184
beas jurisdiction even as it left the statutory right intact.
185
As Judge Griffith explained in his concurrence, none of those
analytical strands is convincing. Virtually every circuit court to consider the question had held, prior to the REAL ID Act, that FARRA
could be invoked in habeas petitions, at least partly in light of the Sus-

expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85.
181
Specifically, the REAL ID Act created 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4), which provides
that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory),
including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a petition for review filed
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section
shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or
claim under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
except as provided in subsection (e) of this section.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2006).
182
Omar, 646 F.3d at 17–18.
183
Id. at 22–23.
184
Id. at 24.
185
Although Judge Griffith sharply disagreed with the majority’s jurisdictional
analysis, he concurred in the judgment based on the belief that Omar lost on the
merits because FARRA does not confer a substantive right upon individuals who were
already detained by the United States in the country the transfer to which they
sought to enjoin. See id. at 29 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 703 n.6 (2008) (suggesting this argument). Whatever the
merits of this view, it should be clear that it would affect a vanishingly small class of
cases.
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pension Clause concerns that might otherwise arise.
Moreover,
there is no support whatsoever in the REAL ID Act’s text or legislative
history for the proposition that Congress meant to repeal the subs187
tantive right that FARRA had conferred.
But Omar’s true violence to precedent is the third holding—that
the Suspension Clause does not prevent Congress from taking away
habeas jurisdiction over statutory rights since Congress never had to
create such a right in the first place (and could at any time repeal it).
As Judge Kavanaugh put it, “Congress could constitutionally achieve
the same result simply by declaring that the transfer policy itself applies only to immigration transferees. The Constitution does not
188
turn on such arcane and empty semantics.” The view that the Suspension Clause does not protect statutory rights is belied by the historical record and is flatly inconsistent with Boumediene and its progeny—in which the bulk of the detainees’ claims were that their
189
detention was inconsistent with the AUMF. As Judge Griffith concluded,
Congress can always repeal statutory rights or create new authority for detention, thereby limiting the range of habeas claims that
federal prisoners may bring. But that is not what Congress has
done here. It has not repealed section 2242(a), the ground for
Omar’s claim, but has instead sought to limit his ability to bring
his claim in federal court. The majority counters that there is no
real difference between expressly repealing a right and accomplishing the same end by stripping habeas jurisdiction. I disagree.
A core premise of the Suspension Clause is that the form of legislative action can make a great deal of difference in terms of political accountability: repealing a right tends to focus the public’s attention in a way that the lawyerly maneuver of jurisdiction
186

See Omar, 646 F.3d at 25–26 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment). See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Case Comment, Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Suspension
Clause After St. Cyr, 113 YALE L.J. 2007 (2004) (explaining why the Suspension Clause
affected the courts’ analysis of FARRA).
187
See H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 176 (2005) (Conf. Rep.); see also Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 133, 137 n.17 (2006–2007) (“The Conference Report describes this provision as
granting, rather than barring, a remedy.”).
188
Omar, 646 F.3d at 22; see also id. (“Because Omar has no constitutional right at
stake here . . . Congress has no obligation to provide judicial review for the extraconstitutional responsibilities the FARR Act imposes on the Executive Branch.”).
189
Indeed, Justice Kennedy in Boumediene specifically avoided holding that the detainees had any constitutional rights. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet
Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2111–
12, 2112 nn.30–32 (2009).
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stripping does not. In fact, the Suspension Clause was inspired by
Parliament’s use of jurisdiction stripping to prevent American
prisoners from asserting their statutory and common law rights,
and Alexander Hamilton thought that the Suspension Clause’s
limits on jurisdiction stripping so enhanced the democratic check
on wrongful detentions that it rendered a bill of rights unnecessary. The Constitution vests in Congress the power to deprive
prisoners of judicially enforceable rights, but “requires that it be
made to say so unmistakably” by either suspending the writ or repealing the right “so that the people will understand and the po190
litical check can operate.”

The majority’s response was to suggest that the Suspension
Clause distinguished between challenges to the “positive legal author191
ity” for the detention and statutory rights against detention.
But
again, as Judge Griffith pointed out, such a distinction is unpersua192
sive on its face, and is in any event inconsistent with a host of Supreme Court decisions treating the two classes of challenges identically for Suspension Clause purposes, including Boumediene and INS v.
193
St. Cyr. Thus, to the extent that Omar turned on this constitutional
holding, it seems utterly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in the field.
Practically, the upshot of these cases is fairly straightforward. Release from custody for Guantánamo detainees will basically be a matter of executive discretion in two directions: discretion under Kiyemba
I to offer resettlement to only one or a small handful of countries to
detainees who cannot be returned to their homes, and discretion under Kiyemba II to involuntarily repatriate those who can. These developments prompted the New York Times in March to view these cases as
standing for the proposition that “[t]he appellate court has all but
nullified that view of judicial power and responsibility backed by Jus194
tice Kennedy and the court majority” in Boumediene.
In my view, the Times’ assertion is a bit of an overstatement as
applied to Kiyemba I and Kiyemba II, but not to the subsequent decision in Omar. Yes, Kiyemba I’s cursory due process analysis is blatantly
190

Omar, 646 F.3d at 29 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Henry
M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1399 (1953)) (citations omitted).
191
Id. at 24 (majority opinion).
192
Id. at 28 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he difference seems to
me no more than ‘empty semantics.’”).
193
Id. at 28–29 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2001)).
194
A Right Without a Remedy, supra note 3.
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inconsistent with Boumediene. But, it may still be the case that, properly understood, the Guantánamo detainees’ due process rights do
(and would) not include a right to be released into the United States.
Instead, the true shortcoming in Kiyemba I is a failure of imagination—the categorical unwillingness of Judge Randolph to consider
other permissible means by which federal courts might use their
powers to effectuate a detainee’s immediate release, including the
route embraced by the Second Circuit in Padilla v. Rumsfeld (i.e., an
order demanding that the detainee be released or indicted on crimi195
nal charges within thirty days). The flaw in Kiyemba I, then, is not in
subverting the letter of Boumediene or other Supreme Court decisions,
196
but the spirit thereof.
And the case for Kiyemba II as a subversion of the Court is even
trickier. Yes, the D.C. Circuit erroneously extended Munaf into a
197
This is an egrecontext in which it was never meant to apply.
gious—and, as noted above, deeply problematic—error. But the only
way in which Kiyemba II flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent
is in the extent to which the panel refused to take seriously Boumediene’s endorsement of analyzing the substantive scope of the Suspension Clause in light of what was true in English practice at the time of
the Founding (the focus of Judge Griffith’s dissents from both the
panel opinion and the decision not to hear Abdah en banc). Nothing
in Boumediene itself directly implies that Kiyemba II is wrong; only a
198
proper understanding of English history does.
Thus, unlike in AlBihani, where the D.C. Circuit ultimately voted seven-two to limit the
scope of the original panel’s holding, the attempt to accomplish the
199
same result vis-à-vis Kiyemba II failed six-three in Abdah.
But the same cannot be said for Omar. Although I elsewhere devote far more detail to the decision, its background, and its implica200
tions, the relevant point for present purposes is that unlike Kiyemba
II, Omar does actively undermine Boumediene by holding that Congress
has the power to deprive federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over
certain types of statutory claims even as it leaves those rights intact. It

195

Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 542
U.S. 426 (2004).
196
See Vladeck, supra note 148, at 971–72.
197
See supra note 162–63 and accompanying text.
198
See Vladeck, supra note 148, at 973–75.
199
See supra notes 167–16868 and accompanying text.
200
Stephen I. Vladeck, Normalizing Guantánamo, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).

VLADECK FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1486

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/7/2011 1:40 PM

[Vol. 41:1451

may be ironic that the most violence that the D.C. Circuit has done to
Boumediene has been in a non-Guantánamo case, but that may only
increase—rather than mitigate—the reach of Omar’s misreading.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not also mention two additional categories of “remedies” cases—those in which former Guantánamo detainees have sought damages arising out of allegedly abusive
treatment while at Guantánamo and those in which former detainees
have sought to conclusively establish the legality of their detention
(or lack thereof) after they have been released.
With regard to damages claims, initially, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of such suits in light of its thenextant holding that the Guantánamo detainees have no constitutional
201
rights whatsoever, and therefore no rights that could give rise to a
202
viable damages claim.
Shortly after Boumediene, though, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated that decision, and remanded
203
with instructions to reconsider in light of Boumediene.
On remand, a D.C. Circuit panel consisting of Judges Henderson, Brown, and Randolph once again held that the detainees could
not state a viable claim, concluding that “the Court in Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the Suspen204
sion Clause.”
Thus, the court rested on the alternative holdings
that (1) the defendant officers were all entitled to qualified immuni205
ty, or (2) “special factors” counseled against inferring a Bivens cause
206
207
of action.
As I have explained elsewhere, this second holding is
part of a problematic larger pattern, endorsed (at least implicitly) by
the Supreme Court, in which lower courts have taken an unjustifiably
narrow view of the availability of Bivens remedies in national security
cases, even where other issues, such as qualified immunity or the state

201

Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763
(2008).
203
Rasul, 129 S. Ct. at 763.
204
Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
205
Id. at 530 (“No reasonable government official would have been on notice that
plaintiffs had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights.”).
206
Id. at 532 n.5.
207
See Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010) (criticizing the reliance on amorphous national security
considerations in decisions like Rasul to justify not inferring a Bivens remedy).
202

VLADECK FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/7/2011 1:40 PM

1487

D.C. CIRCUIT AFTER BOUMEDIENE
208

secrets privilege, would likely stand in the way of relief. In light of
that pattern, it hardly seems surprising that, this time around, the
209
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
To similar effect, the D.C. Circuit in Ali v. Rumsfeld affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a series
of damages suits brought by individuals detained by the United States
in either Iraq or Afghanistan who claimed that they, too, were mi210
Although the panel (Chief Judge Senstreated while in custody.
telle and Judges Henderson and Edwards) divided on the plaintiffs’
211
claims under the Alien Tort Statute, the judges unanimously agreed
that the plaintiffs’ Bivens and declaratory relief claims were barred by
212
either of the two holdings in Rasul II.
The unlikelihood of damages relief for former detainees provides a helpful segue to the final category of “remedies” cases—those
in which individuals seek to obtain final adjudication of their habeas
petition even after they have been released, if for no other reason
than because of the potential collateral consequences that might otherwise result from their detention. In Gul v. Obama, however, Judge
Ginsburg (writing for himself and Judges Tatel and Brown) concluded that the detainees’ release had in fact mooted their claims, at
least largely because the collateral consequences the detainees sought
to mitigate were either too speculative or unlikely to be redressed by
213
a favorable decision on the merits. The combined effect of Rasul II
and Gul is certainly frustrating, since it means that those detainees
who are released without a court order to that effect will almost never
be able to obtain adjudication of whether their detention had ever
been lawful. As Judge Ginsburg explained, though, the Supreme
Court has consistently narrowed the scope of the collateral conse-

208

For perhaps the most distressing example of this trend, see Arar v. Ashcroft, 585
F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
209
Indeed, I think it is safe to conclude that the entire purpose of footnote five in
Rasul II was to insulate the court’s qualified immunity discussion from Supreme
Court review. Given the court’s suggestion that “Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims are therefore foreclosed on this alternative basis, which is also unaffected by the Supreme
Court’s Boumediene decision,” 563 F.3d at 532 n.5, there would have been little reason
for the Justices to second-guess the panel’s first holding.
210
No. 07-5178, 2011 WL 2462851 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011).
211
Compare id. at *7–9, with id. at *10–26 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
212
Id. at *5–7 (majority opinion); id. at *10 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“I do not
disagree with the court’s judgment dismissing appellants’ Bivens claims and their
claims for declaratory relief.”).
213
No. 10-5117, 2011 WL 2937166, at *8 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011).
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214

quences doctrine in recent years —including in cases where the
consequences were far more concrete and immediate.
And so, yet again, it is difficult to see in the result in Rasul II, Ali,
215
or Gul any outright defiance of the Supreme Court. True, the D.C.
Circuit in the damages cases again seemed unwilling to take seriously
Boumediene’s effect on the proper analysis as to whether individual
constitutional protections apply to non-citizens outside the territorial
United States. But it is hardly inconsistent with Boumediene or other
Supreme Court decisions to (1) conclude that the defendant officers
are entitled to qualified immunity in an area where the law was not
well-settled, or (2) decline to recognize a Bivens remedy in a context
in which one has not previously been recognized. And nothing in
Boumediene says anything about a detainee’s right to obtain adjudication of his detention after he is released.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most of the commentary regarding the D.C. Circuit-subvertingBoumediene meme has focused on the transfer and release cases, and
for good reason. Digging down to the nuts and bolts of those cases
that turn on the facts is a time-consuming—and, given the amount of
classified information in some of the opinions, often futile—task.
Nevertheless, if the above analysis suggests any one conclusion in particular, it is that, other than Omar, cases like Al-Bihani and Al-Adahi
reflect a far greater degree of hostility to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this field than cases like Kiyemba I, Kiyemba II, and Rasul.
Reasonable minds will surely disagree about whether the court of appeals is reaching the “right” results in the latter cases, but if there are
flaws in the specific holdings, my own view is that comparable shortcomings can also be found in much of the non-Guantánamo, nonD.C. Circuit case law as well. In contrast, on the “merits” of the detainee cases, the analysis and the holdings reflect a profound tension
with both Boumediene and Hamdi, and a fundamental unwillingness by
the D.C. Circuit—especially Judges Brown, Kavanaugh, Randolph,
and Silberman—to take seriously the implications of the Supreme
Court’s analysis in either case. Between them, Hamdi and Boumediene
214

Id. at *2–4.
To be sure, the court in Gul “assum[ed] without deciding” that the collateral
consequences doctrine applies to the Guantánamo detainees. See id. at *3. A case can
certainly be made that the collateral consequences doctrine is compelled by the Suspension Clause itself (and not just the federal habeas statute), and, as such, that its
application follows from Boumediene. But refusing to expressly so hold can hardly be
criticized as subverting Boumediene.
215
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do not just require some judicial review of the government’s evidence;
rather, they compel a “meaningful” opportunity on the detainee’s
part to challenge the factual and legal basis for his detention. If every
inference is being drawn against the detainee, or if the use of the
“mosaic” theory is having the effect of watering down the burden of
proof, it is difficult to conclude how such review satisfies that command.
More generally, though, perhaps the larger point to take away is
how the more troubling analyses vis-à-vis Hamdi and Boumediene invariably originate with some combination of the same four jurists.
Sometimes, they have been joined by others; sometimes, they have
concurred separately. But the decisions that have raised the sharpest
tensions with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence have tended to
come in cases in which the panel included two members of this quartet. In marked contrast, the rest of the D.C. Circuit has tended toward more moderate holdings, embracing the growing consensus in
both the district court and the executive branch as to (1) the relevance of the laws of war vis-à-vis the scope of detention authority; (2)
the extent to which the AUMF should not be interpreted by reference
to the MCA; (3) the appropriateness of preponderance as the relevant burden of proof; and (4) the requirement that detainees who
have been cleared for release be afforded at least some remedy, even if
that remedy is suboptimal. That is not to commend the work of the
rest of the D.C. Circuit as such, but merely to suggest that, where
those cases have reached what some see as incorrect outcomes, there
is nowhere near the same degree of tension between the work of the
court of appeals and the guidance provided by the Supreme Court.
Moreover, even as the number of Guantánamo detention cases
inexorably winds down, it is hardly obvious that the D.C. Circuit will
be done with the Guantánamo detainees anytime soon. After all, under the 2006 MCA, as amended in 2009, the D.C. Circuit hears appeals as of right from decisions by the intermediate Court of Military
216
Commission Review, which has finally handed down its first deci217
sions on the merits in post-conviction appeals under the MCA. Given the Obama administration’s decision to proceed with military
commission trials for the 9/11 defendants, it seems inevitable that
comparable issues will return to the D.C. Circuit before long, whether
or not additional post-Boumediene detention cases raise them. In light
216

10 U.S.C. § 950g (2006 & Supp. III 2010).
See United States v. Al-Bahlul, No. 09-001 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Sept. 9, 2011);
United States v. Hamdan, No. 09-002 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. June 24, 2011).
217
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of the cases surveyed above, it is entirely reasonable to suspect that
Judges Brown, Kavanaugh, Randolph, and Silberman will show comparable skepticism toward the claims advanced by the defendants in
those cases, whether or not such skepticism is warranted. The question then will be whether, as was true in Al-Bihani, their colleagues
will see the need to intervene.

